Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished Delegates,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great privilege for me, personally, to be at this important Symposium.  And I owe a deep gratitude to the China National Committee for Pacific Economic Co-operation for the generous invitation to me to speak at this forum.  My great appreciation is also due to all those who have worked very hard — not only to make this Symposium a complete success but also to make our stay in this beautiful and famous city of Chengdu even more enjoyable and memorable.

My presentation at this session will focus on the patterns and potential of ASEAN-China economic relationships and co-operation – with special reference to trade and investment. There are three major points I wish to make. The first point is that economies and business enterprises in the region are facing a new and different economic environment — in globalization and in the emergence of the new economy .  There are formidable challenges.  But there also is much potential for mutual benefit, especially through cross-border co-operation and inter-firm networking.

A.  THE NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

Globalization has opened up unlimited opportunities for gainful co-operation in trade and investment among countries and communities.  In fact, the globalization process has provided a dynamic platform – one which is essential to sustain high rates of economic growth and social development among many regional countries.  These include not just China but also most ASEAN member countries.

But there are difficult challenges ahead as well.  Through globalization, there is now much greater instability and much more competition in trade and financial resources.  In addition, better access to information and to different sources of supplies have rendered consumer tastes more sophisticated as well as more demanding – especially in terms of quality, reliability, health, safety, social equity and ecological preservation.  Such challenges can be very severe, particularly for the newer members of ASEAN.

In the same way, rapid advances in information and communication technologies (or ICTs) have resulted in large jumps in economic efficiency and flexibility.  They have, furthermore, greatly increased the importance of knowledge and innovation in production and productivity.  Indeed, access to information and knowledge has become a determinant of business success or failure in its own right.

But by breaking down the barriers of space and time, ICTs have also emphasized the great virtues of inter-firm co-operation, linkages and alliances under the new economy.  Indeed, successful enterprises of the future are likely involved in various production networks and/or supply chains within and across border.  Such an involvement and partnership are facilitated by e-commerce transactions, as well as by other value-adding modalities made possible by the current technological revolution. 

Clearly, the new technologies have accelerated the process of globalization and regionalization of trade and financial flows across the world.  But equally clearly, not all economies or all enterprises are able to benefit fully from the new technologies.  And as such, they will continue to suffer from a comparative disadvantage — requiring therefore special and differential treatment and flexibility, and as appropriate, technical assistance for their on-going globalization efforts.

B.  RISING TRENDS IN ASEAN-CHINA TRADE AND INVESTMENT

The above observations bring me to the second point – namely that the process of globalization and regionalization has served to increase trade and trade-related investment relationships, including those between ASEAN and China .  As noted earlier, however, the pace and patterns of such an increase have not been even or evenly spread.  This applies particularly among ASEAN member countries (or even among various domestic regions) at different stages of economic and social development.

Value of Trade.  There has been a steady, if not spectacular, rise in the relative share of ASEAN in China’s merchandise trade – from 5.8 per cent in 1991 to 8.3 per cent in 2000.  ASEAN has thus become the fifth largest trade partner of China (after Japan, the United States, the European Union, and the Special Administrative Region (SAR) of Hong Kong).  And this is an important trend: the absolute value of China’s trade, for example, went up very significantly – from US$ 135.8 billion in 1991 to as much as US$ 473.4 billion in 2000 (table 1).

At the same time, China has also become an important trade partner of ASEAN, occupying the sixth position in 2000.  The share of China in ASEAN’s trade expanded from 2.3 per cent in 1991 to 5.0 per cent in 2000.  In absolute terms, the total value of ASEAN’s trade was US$ 343.8 billion in 1991 but rising up to US$ 795.0 billion in 2000.

Structure of Trade.  The composition of ASEAN-China trade has evolved considerably. Resource-based commodities – especially hydrocarbon, wood, and fat and oil products – accounted for two-thirds of the total export value of ASEAN to China in the early 1990s, but only 22 per cent in 1999.  The relative share of manufacture goods – electrical machinery and computer equipment especially – went up from 12 to 38 per cent in the same periods.

Meanwhile, ASEAN imports from China have been comparatively more diversified.  The top five imports (namely electrical machinery, computer equipment, hydrocarbon products, cotton and tobacco) accounted for almost two-fifths of the total import value in the early 1990s, and 57 per cent in 1999 (with cereals plus ships and boats replacing cotton and tobacco in relative importance).

Trade in Services.  The two-way flows between ASEAN and China have also been on an increase.  Tourism is a good case in point.  ASEAN tourists visiting China totaled almost 1.1 million in 1995; the number reached an estimated 1.8 million in 2000.  Meanwhile, ASEAN received about 0.8 million tourists from China in 1995.  More remarkably, however, the number of Chinese tourists to ASEAN almost tripled to 2.3 million persons in 2000. 

The potential for two-way tourism is really inviting.  At present, ASEAN tourists were less than 8 per cent of the total tourist arrivals (19.8 million) in China during 1999 while Chinese tourists in ASEAN made up just 10 per cent of the 22.6 million persons visiting ASEAN in 2000 (table 1).

Investment Flows.  Both ASEAN and China have invested considerable resources overseas.  Foreign direct investment (or FDI) made by China in other countries averaged US$ 2.1 billion per year during 1989-1994; it rose to US$ 2.2 billion a year over 1995-2000.  Outward FDI from the old ASEAN-5 members (except Brunei Darussalam) averaged US$ 3.7 billion a year during 1989-1994; it reached US$ 7.0 billion in 2000.

China has been a destination for FDI from some ASEAN member countries — directly or via the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong .  Likewise, several ASEAN member countries have also been the host to important FDI flows from China, both directly and via third party ventures.  For example, China’s FDI in ASEAN amounted to about US$ 114.4 million in 1995 but fell to US$ 135.8 in 1999.  The flows of such investment in ASEAN have thus been modest, averaging some US$ 146 million a year during 1995-1999.  In relative terms, they accounted for less than 0.5 per cent of the total inward FDI in ASEAN per year, except for 1998-1999 when the percentage averaged 1.3 per cent a year.

As such, it is likely that the old ASEAN-5 (excluding Brunei Darussalam) collectively have been a net investor in China.  In general, a large proportion of FDI is channeled to resource-based and trade related activities. Manufacturing for the domestic market is also another important sector for such investment.  In addition, there is considerable FDI “in kind” – that is the investors supply manufacturing equipment and machinery as equity in the joint ventures with their local partners, who usually provide land and infrastructure . 
 

C.  FUTURE POTENTIAL AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR
ASEAN-CHINA CO-OPERATION.

And now, I wish to come to the third point in ASEAN-China trade and investment relationships.  It is clear that the industrialized countries in America and Europe will continue to be the most important trade markets, sources of investment finance, and origins of cutting-edge technologies for both ASEAN and China in the foreseeable future.  But within this region, there are potential and opportunities – both substantial and exciting – for greater and closer ASEAN-China complementarities along their pathways of development. 

Certainly, it is not possible to go into specific details at this stage; that would need much more solid quantitative research and modeling.  But the directions of co-operation and interaction are apparent enough, and there are thus many reasons for optimism, however guarded this may be.
1.  Macro-level Parameters

Two positive factors operate at the macroeconomic level.  One, the Chinese economy is a huge economy.  Gross domestic product (GDP) reached US$ 1,080 billion in 2000.  In comparison, the combined GDPs of ASEAN amounted to US$ 573.8 in the same year.  What is more, China has been the fastest growing economy in the world for over a decade.  Even during the economic crisis and slowdown of the late 1990s, GDP in China continued to expand by between 7 to 9 per cent a year during 1997-2001.  On the other hand, GDPs of several ASEAN member countries contracted, some quite severely, in 1997 and slowed downed significantly during this year.

Two, income per head of population in China went up from US$ 342 in 1991 to US$ 855 in 2000.  This income level will double every 7 to 8 years with the maintenance of China’s solid economic performance.  The average per capita income within ASEAN as a whole is about US$ 1240 – with a big gap between Singapore and Brunei Darussalam and the remaining members .  Compared to China, the rate of expansion in income is likely to be slower in most parts of ASEAN.

In general, as income grows and the standard of living rises, so will domestic demand for a variety of goods and services.  These include typically various kinds of imported goods as well as outward travel for tourism and other purposes, including education and training.  Imported consumer goods and overseas travel, for example, have served both as an incentive for work and earnings, as well as an outlet for unsatisfied (or pent-up) demand.  Surely, ASEAN will be in a position to supply competitively some of such import demand for goods and services from China; and vice versa (more on this below).
 

2.  Sector-level Elements

The second set of reasons for cautious optimism can be seen from three positive developments at the sectoral level. 

a.  Low trade penetration. 

Foreign trade has expanded very fast in China. Although the ratio of total trade to GDP has been rising, it is still comparatively low at 44 per cent in China during 2000 (table 1).  In addition, the ratio of ASEAN-China trade to GDP, although rising, is still very low – for example, in the range of only 2.0 to 3.7 per cent in the case of China during 1991-2000. Moreover, the trade flows between exports and imports have been relatively balanced, although ASEAN has been enjoying a merchandise trade surplus (of exports to China compared to imports from China) in recent years. 

Thus, an increase of a few percentage points in the trade/GDP ratios between ASEAN and China can be expected with reasonable confidence (more below).  And these few points already are worth tens of billions of dollars on the basis of trade flows for the year 2000 (table 1).

b.  World Trade Organization (WTO) membership. 

This accession is a significant and welcome development for the world’s eighth largest trading country and for the world’s largest destination for FDI among the developing countries.  China’s WTO membership is widely expected to have several positive spill-over effects on ASEAN-China trade and investment relationships in a wide range of areas and services.

Firstly, China has agreed to a very comprehensive package of market liberalization measures, with five years to carry out its full commitments.  The liberalization process is expected to enhance greatly China’s economic efficiency, industrial modernization, and integration with the global economy.

In particular, various research studies indicate (a) higher levels of China’s share in global exports and imports, by 2 percentage points by 2005; (b) higher levels of export earnings (by 24 per cent) and import spending (by 18 per cent), and (c) higher GDP growth by at least one percentage point (equivalent thus to over US$ 10 billion on the basis of GDP in 2000) .

Secondly, there will be greater market access to ASEAN in China.  Trade barriers on ASEAN exports, for example, will be reduced faster than the average reduction – with tariffs on ASEAN products to be cut by 34 per cent (to 47 per cent) within five years.  It is estimated that, with accession to WTO, China’s demand for ASEAN imports will expand by 10 per cent a year.  Thus, the value of such imports will reach US$ 35.5 billion in 2005, compared to 22.2 billion in 2000.  However, the actual increase may even be larger, given the faster rate of China’s imports of ASEAN products relative to China’s imports from all sources. 

Resource-based goods from ASEAN will continue to have a comparative advantage in China –especially hydrocarbons products; semi- and processed agriculture, aquaculture and forestry items etc. (more in sub-section 3 below).  But there are likely to be complementarities in electrical machinery and computer equipment, the main source of exports of several ASEAN members — including Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand .

Thirdly, there will also be greater market access to China among ASEAN member countries.  In this connection, the sectors facing greater competition from China include textiles and clothing plus labour-intensive manufactures (such as electronics assembly, footwear, toys and plastic products).  In addition, China is expected to enjoy a competitive advantage in a wide range of manufactures.  These include building materials, machinery and electrical appliances, optical instruments, clocks and watches, metal products and chemicals. 

In fact, such manufacture goods accounted for about 70 per cent of all ASEAN imports from China.  Imports of machinery and electrical appliances alone reached 51 per cent of total import value in 1999.  They have also expanded faster than ASEAN import of similar products from all other sources during 1993-1999.

Fourthly, in a similar manner, China will likely enjoy a comparative advantage over ASEAN in the United States, the European Union and Japan – by far the most important export markets for both ASEAN and China.  For example, China has been and will remain the dominant supplier of textiles and clothing in Japan (with a relative share rising from 44 to 62 per cent between 1993 and 1999). 

China’s share in the import of machinery and electrical appliances in the three markets above has also risen much faster than that of ASEAN.  In the United States, for example, the share expanded from 3.7 to 8.3 per cent during 1993-1999; ASEAN share, meanwhile, went up from 14.4 to 15.6 per cent.  In Japan, China’s relative share rose from 5 to 12.4 per cent, compared to 17 and 23.5 per cent for imports from ASEAN, for the same period

Higher income growth through WTO accession will have a positive impact on trade in services, ASEAN-China tourism especially, and on two-way FDI flows in resource-based, trade-related and manufacturing activities.  These matters will be considered further in sub-section 3 below. 

Generally, it appear that both ASEAN and China will have to manage — effectively and in a forward-looking manner — the many challenges from trade liberalization as well as from their own competition in third-country markets.  The promotion and facilitation of cross-border co-operation, inter-firm networking, and mutual dialogues is among the key requirements for the effective management and mitigation of such challenges.  It is also essential to ensure smoother integration over time.

c.  Closer economic integration. 

Another important element at the sector-level was the decision by leaders of ASEAN and China (made at their summit in November 2000) to look at ways and means to enhance economic co-operation and integration between ASEAN and China.  Among the possible options includes the possibility of setting up a free-trade area (FTA) between the two sides.  The market and purchasing power are very much enlarged by the FTA – to over 1.7 billion consumers with a combined GDP of almost US$ 1,665 billion and a combined external trade value of US$ 1,269 billion as of 2000.

The removal of trade and investment barriers will certainly lower transaction costs, raise economic efficiency, upgrade product quality, increase economies of scale and scope etc.  All these will help improve external competitiveness in third-market trade.  The (net) trade creation effects could be substantial, and so are the bigger flows of trade-related investment. 

Preliminary estimates suggest that the ASEAN-China FTA would raise ASEAN’s exports to China by 48 per cent and China’s export to ASEAN, by 51 per cent.  At the same time, the combined GDP of ASEAN would expand by at least US$ 5.4 billion while that of China, by some US$ 2.2 billion.

Again, one of the biggest challenges in liberalizing trade and investment relationships between ASEAN and China is in the management of change.  This applies especially in the mutual restructuring of sectors, industries and enterprises; in technology and quality up-grading, in training and re-training of human resources; in applying new modes of enterprise organization and innovative management practices etc. 
In the above context, ASEAN members have gained much experience in practice through the accelerated implementation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and through such operational schemes as ASEAN Industrial Co-operation (AICO) and ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) .  In particular, AFTA is scheduled to be in force from 2010, instead of 2015 – with some extension for the newer ASEAN member countries.  From next year (2002) all quantitative and non-tariff restrictions for Inclusion List items will be eliminated.  Tariffs on items under this list will be removed or limited to a maximum of 5 per cent – again, with the newer members being given more time for adjustment.  The Inclusion List accounts for some 85 per cent of all tariff lines in ASEAN.

3.  Micro-level Factors

The third set of reasons for cautious optimism as regards the potential and opportunities for ASEAN-China economic relationships are the positive impact of trade and investment liberalization at the microeconomic level.  A few typical examples come to mind .

One, with economic development and higher personal income, there will be increased consumption of higher quality food, and of more protein and variety in food intake – especially high-quality rice, meat and fishery products, vegetables and vegetable oils, (temperate and tropical) fruit and flowers, nuts and spices etc.  In fact, the elasticities of demand for many of these high-value and high-value added products are proportionately as high as 2.2 for one unit of increase in disposable personal income.

As such and furthermore, there will be a great demand for complementary raw materials. Additional feed grains and feed cakes, for example, are needed for conversion into protein (such as in live stocks and aquaculture), or into various kinds of alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks.  Indeed, for a variety of reasons, the additional consumption (both direct as food grains and indirect as feed grains) from China alone is likely to be very substantial in the coming decades .

ASEAN has earned substantial amounts of foreign exchange by exporting these high-value, income-elastic products.  In fact, South-East Asia has long being the “bread basket” of the world.  It will be in a competitive position to meet the expected, sharp rise in demand from China for a wide range of final and intermediate products, indicated above. Many parts of the region are also in a good position to produce and supply environmentally preferable, natural products which command a premium price in world markets.

Two, tourism will expand as affluence spreads.  As noted earlier, the potential is great for a substantial increase in two-way tourist flows between ASEAN and China, and for service-related FDI in restaurants and tourism facilities.  On the one hand, the two-way flows of tourists are still relatively small, especially in terms of the total number of tourists visiting ASEAN or China (table 1).  On the other hand, the growing markets for eco-tourism, thematic tourism, adventure tourism and multiple-destination tourism remain to be tapped in and by both ASEAN and China.

Three, win-win possibilities exist in trade and trade-related FDI in various manufacturing sectors within ASEAN and China.  Productive activities and industries will have to upgrade and move on to a different level of comparative advantage – through comprehensive trade and investment liberalization and, on the other hand, through economic growth, social development and a rising standard of living over time.  Such a movement will make room for others to fill up the vacant economic space. 

This is the famous “flying geese” development patterns and product cycles as demonstrated by East and South-East Asian economies over the past 40 years.  They embody the synergies between external investment and local resources through the gradual relocation of FDI and technologies to sectors, industries and enterprises in various countries and domestic regions.  The potential for such relocation from the front runners to the later industrializers or late comers will be significant and appealing for the foreseeable future. 

On the one hand, FDI as a whole still accounted for a small proportion of total domestic investment in both ASEAN and China.  The ratio of FDI to total investment, for example, amounted to only 12-17 per cent in China, Malaysia and Thailand during 1990-1999; the ratio for Singapore being about 25 per cent for the same decade. 

On the other hand, the same development patterns will persist so that dynamic complementarities in external trade and foreign investment will emerge continuously over time — across ASEAN and China, and within ASEAN and within diverse regions of China, too.  This applies especially with greater co-operation in trade and investment – across-border, inter-firm, and among inter-linked growth areas or special development zones within and across countries – leading to closer economic integration between ASEAN and China over time .

 
Mr. Chairman,

By way of conclusion, allow me to reiterate some of the main points.  One, there are great potential and opportunities for closer trade and investment relationships and inter-firm networking between ASEAN and China. Two, such potential and opportunities can be charted and commercialized with good economic returns – particularly in terms of mutual income growth, poverty alleviation and social advancement.  Three, the whole process can be accelerated through cross-border co-operation in the mutual liberalization of trade and investment; in the mutual promotion of cross-border linkages and inter-firm partnerships; as well as in the mutual facilitation of the needed transformation, diversification and upgrading of sectors, industries and enterprises among the countries concerned.

Thank you very much for your attention.
 

Table 1. ASEAN-China Trade and Investment Interaction

 

___________________________________________________________________________

                                                                        ASEAN 1/                               China 2/____      

Areas                                                   1991    1995    2000                1991    1995    2000

___________________________________________________________________________

 

1. Merchandise trade 3/

 

     – Total value (US$ billion)                343.8   675.6   795.0               135.8   281.1   474.3

     – ASEAN’s trade with China              2.3      2.9       5.0               — not applicable —    

(% of total trade of ASEAN)

     – China’s trade with ASEAN           — not applicable —                    5.8       6.9       8.3

            (% of total trade of China)

    

2. Tourist arrivals (million)

 

     – Total number                                 11.7    17.7    22.6                9.5     16.1    19.8 4/

     – ASEAN tourists in China  — not applicable —                 0.3     1.1        1.8

     – China tourists in ASEAN   n.a.        0.8       2.3                   — not applicable –

 

3. Investment flows (US$ billion)

 

     – Total FDI outflows 6/                       1.1       7.0       7.5                 0.9       2.0       2.3

     – Total FDI inflows 7/                      13.2   24.8     13.4                4.4    35.8   40.8

 

4. Total production

 

     – GDP (US$ billion)                        367.8   642.7   573.8 8/           400.0   700.1 1079.9

     – Estimated GDP per head of          1 137   1 520   1 240 8/              342      574     855              

           population (in US dollar)                                   

 

5. Ratios of production to trade (%)

 

   – Trade/GDP                                       93.5  105.3 138.6              34.0   40.2   43.9

   – ASEAN’s trade with China/              2.1       3.0       6.9                — not applicable —    

       ASEAN’s GDP

   – China’s trade with ASEAN/           — not applicable —                    2.0       2.8       3.7

         China’s GDP

______________________________________________________________________________

 

Sources:  Compiled from database of IMF, International Financial Statistics and Direction of Trade Statistics; of ASEAN National Tourism Organizations and World Tourism Organization; from UNCTAD, World Investment Report, various issues; from ESCAP, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific, various issues; and from ADB, Development Outlook and Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, various issues.

Notes:

1/  Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia (from 1999), Indonesia, Lao PDR (from 1999), Malaysia,
Myanmar (from 1997), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam (from 1995)
2/  Excluding the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong.
3/  Both exports (f.o.b.) and imports (c.i.f.).
4/  1999.  
5/  Estimate. 
6/  Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand only.
7/  Same as above plus Viet Nam.
8/  Falling value to the financial and economic crisis plus the lower exchange rates in several ASEAN member countries since July 1997.

ENDNOTES

  1. Thanks are due to Dr. Robert Teh, Jr., Director of the Bureau of Trade, Industry and Services (BTIS), Mr. Noordin Azhari, Assistant Director, BTIS, and Dr. Wee Kee Hwee, Assistant Director, BTIS, of the ASEAN Secretariat for several comments and suggestions which helped improve the contents and analysis in this paper.  However, the author alone is responsible for any remaining shortcomings in the paper.
  2. For a detailed analysis, see N. V. Lam and Thitapha Wattanapruttipaisan, “The New WTO Round and Concerns of the Least Developed Countries and Economies in Transition of Asia:  Bridging the Gap?”, paper presented at the Joint ICTSD/CEE/HBF Regional Dialogue for Governments and Civil Society on Trade, Environment and Sustainable Development – Towards an Asian Agenda, Chiang Mai, 29-30 March 2001 (forthcoming); and N. V. Lam, “Globalization, Development and the Multilateral Trading System” in ESCAP, Development through Globalization and Partnership in the Twenty-first Century (New York, United Nations, 2000), pp. 7-58 and pp. 199-208 (references).
  3. The main sources of data and information in this section are from various estimates of the ASEAN Secretariat, including those in the ASEAN Investment Report 2000: Challenges and Development (Jakarta, ASEAN Secretariat, 2000); from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics and International Financial Statistics database; from the database of ASEAN National Tourism Organizations and World Tourism Organization; from UNCTAD, World Investment Report, various issues; from ESCAP, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific, various issues; and from Asian Development Bank, Development Outlook and Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, various issues.
  4. Hong Kong, China, has been an important trade and investment partner of ASEAN.  In 2000, for example, the share of ASEAN’s trade with this SAR was equivalent to 4.4 per cent of the total ASEAN’s foreign trade; the corresponding ratio of ASEAN’s trade being 8.5 per cent of the foreign trade value (US$ 412.4 billion ) of Hong Kong, China.  In 2000, the GDP of Hong Kong, China, reached US$ 162.6 billion, equivalent thus to almost US$ 24,000 per head of resident.  During the same year, there were almost 1.1 million Hong Kong tourists visiting ASEAN member countries.  The number of ASEAN tourists going to Hong Kong, China, was estimated at around 1.5 million in 2000.
  5. It is worth noting the growing attraction of China as the host economy for FDI.  Such inward investment averaged just under US$ 14 billion a year during 1989-1994.  The flow reached almost US$ 41 billion a year over 1995-2000.  Some 400 of the Fortune 500 biggest corporations have invested in over 2000 projects in China.  As a whole, inward FDI from all sources in ASEAN has not been expanding and diversified that fast.
  6. During 2000, for example, income per head of population was in the range of US$ 23,000-17,600 in Singapore and Brunei Darussalam; US$ 2,800-2,000 in Malaysia and Thailand; US$ 1,000-730 in Philippines and Indonesia; and around US$ 400-255 in the newer ASEAN member countries, except Myanmar for which information is not available.
  7. See, for example, E. Ianchovichina and Will Martin, Trade Liberalization in China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization (World Bank, June 2001); Li Shangton and Zhai Fan, Impact of WTO Accession on China’s Economy (Beijing, 2000); and Yu Yongding et al., Research Report on China’s Entry into WTO (Beijing, Social Sciences Document Publishing House, 2000)
  8. It should be noted that the WTO commitments by China may not be fully accorded to the three non-WTO members of ASEAN – namely Cambodia, Lao PDR and Viet Nam.  In addition, the structural capacity of the four new ASEAN members to reallocate their resources to take advantage of any market opening in China may be limited.  Thus, the provision of special and differential treatment, and of technical assistance and capacity building may be needed in the above context.
  9. Further information is contained in the following publications from the ASEAN Secretariat:  ASEAN Annual Report 1999-2000; ASEAN Briefing Paper – Economic Integration (November 2000); ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA): An Update (2000); and ASEAN Investment Area: An Update (2000).
  10. For more details, see ESCAP, Proceedings of the Seminar on the Role of China in Intraregional Trade, Beijing, 29-30 June 2000; chapters II and III; and N. V. Lam, “Globalization, Development and the Multilateral Trading System” in ESCAP, Development through Globalization and Partnership in the Twenty-first Century, op. cit., pp.37-40.
  11. For a more detailed analysis, see Ross Garnaut and Guonan Ma, Grain in China (Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1992); and UNCTAD, The Rice Economy: Market Structure and Prospects (Geneva, 1995).
  12. Some tentative views and estimates of the impact on Asian trade and investment of China’s Accession in WTO can be found in ESCAP, Proceedings of the Seminar on the Role of China in Intraregional Trade, Beijing, 29-30 June 2000; op. cit., chapters II, III and IV; and E. Ianchovichina and Will Martin, Trade Liberalization in China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization, op. cit.